The common pro-sprawl argument that Europe is "just like us"
I am starting to draft a book review of Robert Bruegmann's book on sprawl, and I notice that he's relying on one argument that I've seen before but haven't really researched in the past: the idea that Europe is sprawling just like us, so therefore sprawl must be inevitable and universal.

This argument is not completely without factual support: to be fair, auto ownership and use has grown in Europe, and auto commutes as a percentage of all trips has increased.

But reality is more complex than this simple picture suggests.

First of all, between 1991 and 2002 (the last date for which I could find figures) the automobile share of transportation has increased- but only modestly, from 83.4% to 84.9%. In some countries, the auto market share has held steady or decreased. In Great Britian, the auto market share held steady at about 88%. In Denmark, the auto market share decreased from 82.3% to 80.3%. In Austria, the auto market share decreased from 79.5% to 76.3%.

Moreover, transit ridership has increased. Between 1995 and 2003, regional streetcar and subway ridership increased by 12.5% and bus ridership by 3.7%. (See Table 3.3.2 of This European Union report. )

What about central city decline, another index of sprawl? In Europe, as in America, many cities lost population in the late 20th century. But in Europe, as in America, many core cities are rebounding. According to this report, about half of European cities regained population in the late 1990s.

If "sprawl" means the existence of some development everywhere that resembles American sprawl, yes, sprawl exists everywhere. But if sprawl means the fate of Detroit or Cleveland in the 1ate 20th century- nosediving transit ridership, dying inner cores, the whole ball of wax, sprawl isn't universal at all.