blogging from AALS
I just finished attending the
AALS law professors' conference, and thought I would tell my readers (if there are any out there) about some of the more interesting discussions.
A. The Law of Imaginary Jewish Theocracies
On Thursday morning I went to a panel on the religious implications of Jews ruling over people of other faiths. Panelists included (but were not limited to) Rabbi Bleich of Cardozo, Shayna Sigman of Minnesota and Noah Feldman of NYU.
Prof. Feldman began by discussing Maimonides' laws of war and peace. Maimonides wrote a Jewish legal code which, among other issues, discussed wars by Jewish kingships and the aftermath of same.
He wrote that a Jewish kingdom governed by Jewish law should always give enemies a chance to peacefully surrender (See Deut. 20:10). Terms of
surrender, according to Maimonides, were to include (1) submission of course, (2) acceptance of Noahide laws (laws which, according to the Talmud, were given by God to Noah and Adam and are thus binding upon mankind- mostly ethical, but also including prohibitions upon (a) idol worship and (b) eating limbs torn from live animals), and (3) paying taxes.
Maimonides explained that submission did not just mean willingness to live in peace among the victorious Jews, but also being second-class citizens, "despised and subordinated" (according to my notes) and unable to hold public office. Prof. Feldman suggested that this definition of submission was essentially identical to Muslim doctrines of the time (i.e. that polytheists were to be wiped out, and that Jews and Christians could live in Muslim communities as second-class citizens). In support of this view, Feldman noted similarities between the words used by Maimonides and Arabic terms for submission.
Feldman also pointed out that later commentators disagree over how Maimonides interpreted "willingness to live by Noahide laws." Prof. Feldman argued that such "willingness" included acceptance of the laws by reason as well as by revelation. Other translators assert that only the latter constituted submission to the Noahide laws. In any event, Maimonides hardly endorsed freedom of religion by modern standards, since he (like the Muslims) did not endorse freedom of religion for polytheists.
Finally, Feldman pointed out that Maimonides did not hold that Jews had an affirmative obligation to conquer nonbelievers- only that, in the unlikely event they did so, they were to insist on observance of the Noahide laws. Why? Feldman's explanation is that the purpose of the doctrine is to protect Jews from being infected by idolatry, rather than to protect pagans from themselves. In other words, idol-worshippers can do as they please on their own, but not in a Jewish-ruled kingdom lest the Jews be seduced into idolatry.
Rabbi Bleich asserted that the whole discussion was nuts. He began by pointing out that later commentators radically expanded the Noahide laws as to include something very similar to Jewish ritual obligations. For example, some commentators asserted that if you don't slaughter an animal properly under Jewish law, eating the animal constitutes eating part of a "living animal" (for technical reasons that I'm not sure I can adequately explain- something about how the internal organs are treated as "living" if the animal is not properly slaughtered). Thus, not eating nonkosher meat would be part of a Noahide law, and thus Muslims, Christians, etc. are in violation of the Noahide laws unless they are vegetarians.
In other words, Maimonides' halacha, combined with broad interpretation of Noahide laws, would make religious freedom impossible- and even a narrower interpretation would gut religious freedom for polytheists, obviously a result incompatible with modern Western values of freedom of religion.
Bleich therefore reasoned that the Noahide laws were not designed to be practical or relevant. Rather, they are for implementation only in Messianic times if at all. (As my notes describe his remarks- first the law is composed, then God creates a world in which it could be implemented).
Bleich told an amusing story. Supposedly, someone asked Rabbi Joseph Solovetchik (a great 20th-c. Jewish philosopher) what halachic experts would say about Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. The Rav responded "Thank Heaven they don't ask!' - the point being, that any response based on centuries-old writings would probably be highly impractical.
Prof. Sigman made more practical comments, focusing on marriage and divorce law in Israel. Marital law is based on pre-state Ottoman Empire law, which gave each religious community dominance over its own laws. There is no civil marriage. Some problems arising out of this system:
*What happens when one religion's marital laws are far more sexist than the general public policy of the state?
*What happens to people who aren't part of any religious community.
B. Federalism and the Environment
I then went to a more normal discussion about federalism and the environment.
Prof. Engel of Arizona discussed state attempts to regulate global warming. She suggested that these attempts were of questionable economic rationality given the possibility that any real limits on emissions would cause capital to flow to other states without having enough impact to really affect global warming. She suggested that most state-level proposals were purely symbolic. (I am not sure that even national or global policy changes would make a difference- but I'm no expert in the area, to put it mildly).
Prof. Nash of Tulane discussed the difficulty of relying on states to regulate the environment. States have occasionally sought to go beyond federal regulation- but when they do they are usually crushed by either political pressure or by the federal courts, who invoke federal preemption, the dormant Commere Clause, etc. So as long as the feds keep interfering, uniform national regulation is the only effective way to regulate environmental problems.
C. Punitives and Compensatory Awards
Prof. Sharkey of Columbia discussed a study on punitive damages caps, and asserting that where such caps were in effect juries tended to "compensate" by inflating compensatory damage awards (except in auto cases where damages tended to be pretty tangible). By contrast, no such compensatory effect existed in bench trials: judges gave the same amount of compensatory damages whether punitive caps existed or not.
D. Crime Rising and Falling
One of the best presentations was by Prof. Zimring of Chicago (who I think is one of the best public speakers I have ever seen- he'd be a great teacher!), discussing the drop in crime over the past 15 years. Zimring pointed out that crime declined for 10 years in a row (1991-2000) and in some categories was cut in half or nearly so. The most common explanations for the crime drop are (a) increased use of imprisonment, (b) economic prosperity, and (c) fewer crime-prone teenagers due to declining birth rates in the 1970s and 1980s. Zimring pointed out that the Canadians experienced a similar (though somewhat smaller) drop despite the absence of factors (a) and (b). Zimring didn't really answer the question of why the Canadians had a similar experience- just posed the question.
Zimring also noted that NYC's drop in crime was far greater than that of the rest of the country, despite the fact that NYC has more economic inequality than the rest of the country.
E. The Constitution and the Right
I saw Prof. Barnett of Boston Univ. and Prof. Sunstein of Chicago discuss conservatives and constitutional law. What I got out of the discussion is that inside-the-Beltway conservatives aren't really part of a theoretical school, but borrow liberally from two very different constitutional schools: libertarians like Richard Epstein who believe that the New Deal is unconstitutional but often support Warren/Burger Court socially liberal rulings, and "judicial restraint" theorists (like Lino Graglia of Texas) who believe that almost nothing is unconstitutional and thus would upheld both liberal economic legislation and conservative social legislation such as curbs on abortion. Commentators in both groups claim to be originalists (though Barnett says the libertarians are the real originalists). Justices Scalia and Thomas are not consistently in either group, but Thomas leans towards the libertarians, while Scalia leans more towards the judicial restraint group.
F. Kelo and related issues
As I mentioned on this blog some months ago, Kelo v. New London reaffirmed prior precedent allowing government to take land for economic development purposes as long as it compensated landowners. Prof. Merrill of Columbia, Prof. Garnett of Notre Dame, Prof. Salkin of Albany, and Prof. Been of NYU addressed issues related to Kelo.
Prof. Merrill talked about why Kelo is so controversial, and said the argument reflected a cleaveage between utilitarians and "moral rights" attitudes in the public. Utilitarians emphasized the public benefit from economic development, looking at the situation from the government's standpoint rather than that of the person whose property has been taken. Utilitarians tend to favor allowing government to make eminent domain decisions through cost-benefit analysis, while proponents of the "moral rights" view either has no idea where to draw the line or emphasizes blight as a "bright line" test (because someone who allows his property to become "blighted" is blameworthy and thus deserves to have land taken)
Prof. Garnett talked about eminent domain in the real world. First she sketched out a hypothesis of how eminent domain might work: that landowners are systematically undercompensated because they get fair market value (the minimum required under the federal Takings Clause) but don't get relocation expenses, business goodwill, etc.
Then she demolished the hypothesis, pointing out that her research showed that landowners usually get far more than the Constitution requires. Why might this be the case?
*To avoid a nasty court/public relations battle, governments will sometimes overpay landowners to avoid litigation.
*Government usually provides relocation assistance, because the federal government requires it for any federally funded program and some states require it as well. Sometimes, relocation assistance is negotiated. For example, when government took land to build an auto plant in Indiana it gave homeowners about $80K apiece in market value, but $40K more in relocation assistance.
Prof. Garnett added that she nevertheless thought that government does not overcompensate landowners, because giving money beyond fair market value (1) compensates landowners for the "dignitary harm" of losing their land and (2) deters wasteful economic development projects. In fact, she suggested that existing compensation might not be enough to deter wasteful projects, such states often are using federal money and corporations often "take the money and run" (that is, build a plant or office with eminent domain assistance and then move to another city a few years later).
Prof. Salkin discussed a wide variety of state and federal proposals to limit or overrule Kelo, nearly all of which are still under debate. The most meritorious of these proposals involved task forces to study the issue. Other ideas floating around include (1) requiring "blight"(whatver that is) for takings, (2) prohibiting takings for "economic development" (whatever that is), (3) defining "public use" by statute (as the Constitution requires that eminent domain be justified by a public use), (4) increasing compensation for landowners whose property has been taken, and (5) changing procedure (e.g. burdens of proof) in various ways.
Prof. Been pointed out that there is a lot we just don't know about eminent domain, and suggested a variety of avenues for further research. For example:
*What are the unintended consequences of reforms limiting eminent domain?
For example, if we bar economic development takings that give land to private businesses, will that lead to more government-run economic development enterprises (or more government subsidies to private businesses) to get around the restriction?
*Is eminent domain used primarily for infill or greenfield development? Will restricting government use of eminent domain lead to more of one or the other?
*One justification for eminent domain is that it is necessary to deal with "holdouts" (one of a large number of landowners who, rather than voluntarily selling to the government, holds out for an exorbitant price since the consent of every landowner on a parcel is necessary for something useful to be built). How common is the holdout problem?
*Are projects built using eminent domain usually useful or wasteful?
Posted by lewyn
at 12:02 PM EST
Updated: Sunday, 8 January 2006 12:36 PM EST